Current trends and recent strategic
documents point toward a further ramping up of geopolitical competition,
increasing economic protectionism and fragmentation, and a loosening of
the structures of the international order. However, economic
interdependence and transnational ties will likely remain strong enough
to prevent a complete lapse into anarchy and unrestrained competition.
Even so, there is a great risk that the capacity for meeting global
challenges, such as climate change, world poverty, and global health
threats, will be badly damaged.
The End of an Era
In an October 2022 speech
to students, the European Union’s foreign affairs chief, Josep Borrell,
compared Europe to a garden, calling the region “the best combination
of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that
humankind has been able to build.” He contrasted Europe with the rest of
the world, saying, “Most of the world is a jungle and the jungle could
invade the garden.” The remarks triggered protests,
particularly from officials and pundits in the Global South who accused
Borrell of racism and “neocolonialist” arrogance. Borrell later apologized
and said that his comments were not intended to have racial, cultural,
or geographic connotations. He had merely wished to juxtapose an
international order based on principles accepted by all with an
international order based on the will of the strongest, or “the law of
the jungle.”
Borrell also pointed out that the term
“jungle” had been used by other authors, including U.S.
neoconservatives. This was likely a reference to Robert Kagan’s 2018
book, The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World.
Kagan’s book, which was written during the Donald Trump administration,
amounts to a stark warning about the consequences of a U.S. retreat
from its global responsibilities. Kagan writes that without determined
American leadership, nations would revert to traditional patterns of
behavior and the world would relapse into disorder, darkness, and chaos.
Both Borrell’s speech and Kagan’s book are
examples of a spreading perception that the end of the post–Cold War
order is approaching and that the achievements of a relatively peaceful
and orderly historical period are at grave risk.
Challenges to the Liberal and Rules-Based Order
Up until around 2008, the mantra of
Western discourse about international politics was a liberal and
rules-based world order grounded in market economics, democracy, and
multilateral diplomacy. The United States and the EU saw themselves as
the main promoters of such an order, which they hoped would eventually
include most of the world. Since then, faith in this vision has
diminished dramatically.
The U.S. appetite for global leadership
waned, partly for domestic political reasons and partly in response to
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Meanwhile, China continued its
economic and political rise and became a leading technological and
commercial power. Expectations that China’s increased prosperity would
result in political liberalization proved mistaken. On the contrary, the
Chinese leadership became more authoritarian, intolerant of dissent,
and obsessed with the absolute dominance of the Communist Party. An
assertive foreign policy, fueled by nationalist propaganda and sustained
military buildup, now underlines China’s ambition to become the
dominant power in Asia.
At the same time, Russia turned into an
aggressive revisionist power. As demonstrated by Russia’s war in Georgia
in 2008, its annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas in
2014, and its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the leadership in Moscow is
determined to reverse some of the losses of the 1990s, increase Russia’s
territory, and establish robust zones of influence.
The drawing down of Washington’s
international engagement expanded the maneuvering space of stronger
states in the Global South—among them Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—which became increasingly assertive players in
international politics. They forged new coalitions, enhanced their
political and economic influence, and built up their military clout.
Sometimes this resulted in regional struggles for hegemony, forcing
weaker countries to do what they have always done: seek security either
by allying with bigger powers or balancing between them.
Geopolitics, however, is not the only
challenge to an orderly world. International nongovernmental
organizations have documented more than fifteen years of democratic decline. According to Freedom House, about 38 percent
of the global population currently lives in “not free” countries and
only 20 percent lives in “free” countries. Globalization is running out
of steam, as reshoring and decoupling are the slogans of the day and
protectionism rises in many parts of the world. The internet massively
expands opportunities to disseminate propaganda, disinformation, and
fake news. Information is increasingly weaponized in the service of
geopolitics, undermining democratic processes and manipulating public
opinion. Storms, fires, floods, droughts, and other manifestations of
the climate crisis—which is worsening from year to year—disrupt the
lives of millions and threaten stability in many regions.
In the face of these challenges, the
multilateral system is under severe strain and risks losing legitimacy
and effectiveness in tackling transnational challenges. The latest UN development report
notes that cascading and intersecting crises and growing inequalities
are putting the Sustainable Development Goals in jeopardy.
What the Strategic Documents Say
Recent strategic documents present the
return of geopolitics as the decisive factor in the fading of the vision
for a liberal and rules-based world order.
The EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defense
The EU’s Strategic Compass,
finalized in March 2022 amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine, paints
the darkest picture: “We live in a world shaped by raw power politics,
where everything is weaponized and where we face a fierce battle of
narratives.” The document enumerates several symptoms of a
disintegrating order, including “the instrumentalization of migrants,
the privatization of armies, the politicization of the control of
sensitive technologies . . . the dynamics of state failure, the retreat
of democratic freedoms as well as attacks on the ‘global commons’ of
cyber space, the high seas and outer space.” The document notes a severe
deterioration of the security environment, calling for a “quantum leap”
in the EU’s capacity as a security provider. The contrast with the EU’s first security strategy
of 2003 is stark: that document began, “Europe has never been so
prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the
20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability
unprecedented in European history.”
The U.S. National Security Strategy
In introducing the U.S. National Security Strategy,
adopted in October 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden also speaks of a
“significant inflection point in world history,” but the document is
less pessimistic than its European counterpart. It not only highlights
similar concerns about the heating up of geopolitical competition, but
it also expresses confidence in the enduring strength of the United
States as the world’s most powerful nation. Although the National
Security Strategy sharply condemns Russian aggression, it unsurprisingly
focuses more on China, calling the country the United States’ “only
competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and,
increasingly, the economic, military, and technological power to advance
that objective.”
The China-Russia Joint Statement
In February 2022, days before Russia invaded Ukraine, China and Russia adopted a lengthy statement
that amounts to a comprehensive reckoning with the Western approach to
the world order. The statement condemns “some actors representing but a
minority on the international scales” for advocating for unilateral
approaches, resorting to force, interfering in the internal affairs of
others, and generally hampering the development and progress of mankind.
Committing themselves to a “friendship without limits,” the two
countries contrast their own good intentions with the nefarious
practices of “certain states” in areas including trade policy and outer
space.
The document notes an ongoing
transformation of the world order and a trend toward a redistribution of
power. Yet, despite their mistrust and hostility toward the West, China
and Russia do not question the multilateral system that evolved under
U.S. leadership since World War II. They position themselves not as
revolutionary founders of an alternative system but rather as committed
members of an established order, which still is strongly influenced by
malign forces. Their pronouncements on the future of global governance
are deeply conservative. They emphasize the centrality of the United
Nations, the principles of the UN Charter, and international law in
general. They pledge to “advance multipolarity and promote the
democratization of the international system,” but creating an
alternative system does not seem to be on their agenda.
China and Russia have, of course, engaged
in some international institution building. This includes the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective
Security Treaty Organization, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,
and the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS Development
Bank). But these initiatives have limited scope and ambition. Through
these institutions, Russia mainly aims to cement a sphere of influence
in the post-Soviet space, while China aims to project economic power.
Globally, Beijing’s and Moscow’s
priorities are to reduce Western influence and strengthen their own
positions within the existing multilateral system. However, their
declared commitments to the existing order are increasingly at odds with
their aggressive power politics. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and
China’s threatening behavior toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea
challenge fundamental principles of that very order.
Order or Anarchy?
Although the current order is clearly
weakening, it seems unlikely that there will be a fundamental
restructuring of the international system. It would likely take another
global disaster for there to be a fresh start similar to when the United
Nations was created after World War II. At the same time, a complete
relapse into a Hobbesian world of unrestrained and selfish competition
is also quite unlikely; Borrell’s “jungle” metaphor seems wildly
overblown.
Modernization and decades of liberal
economics have brought about a dense network of ties and multiple
interdependencies among states, ties that can only be abandoned at huge
cost (as demonstrated by North Korea). The vast majority of governments
understand that international cooperation remains vital for the future
well-being of their countries and that this cooperation requires an
institutional and legal framework.
Some kind of political order will therefore survive. UN Secretary-General António Guterres recently submitted his report, “Our Common Agenda,”
which includes proposals for a “stronger, more networked and inclusive
multilateral system, anchored within the United Nations.” He will also
host a Summit for the Future in September 2024 that aims to forge a new
global consensus on the future world order. Unfortunately, in light of
current geopolitical rivalries, chances for agreement on major
institutional innovations are limited.
The future multilateral system will
therefore look similar to the existing one, at least on the surface. But
it is likely to be undermined by a growing emphasis on national
sovereignty and identity politics in many parts of the world and by the
fragmentation of the global economy and the rise of protectionism.
Current economic and political trends seem
to point in the direction of a looser international system, leaving
more room for power politics and transactional arrangements between
states that insist on preserving their national sovereignty. Whether
such an order will be capable of dealing effectively with great
transnational challenges is doubtful. In particular, these dynamics will
make it harder to confront the climate crisis, which is the most urgent
and consequential challenge of the coming years.
Multipolar or Bipolar?
The future international system could have
several power centers. But one current division could shape
international politics for several years: the coming together of the
“non-geographic” West on the one hand and the deepening partnership
between China and Russia on the other.
China and Russia see themselves as the
vanguard in the struggle against Western global predominance, and they
are eager to bring others on board. At the last summit meeting of the
BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in June
2022, both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir
Putin argued in favor of expanding the group
into BRICS+. Beijing seemed particularly interested in developing the
forum into a counterweight to the Group of Seven (G7). Argentina, Iran,
and Saudi Arabia have already applied for membership to BRICS+, and
several other countries appear interested. However, it has been
difficult to establish a consensus on expansion among the current BRICS
members.
The story of BRICS enlargement shows that
as much as China and Russia preach multipolarity, they are actually
working toward a bipolar constellation of forces in which they would
lead a broad alliance of countries in countering the preponderance of
the West. The war in Ukraine has reinforced these tendencies. Weakened
by military setbacks and Western sanctions, Russia will likely become
increasingly dependent on China and, to some extent, will be forced to
align with the strategic interests of its partner. And facing a
worsening rivalry with the United States, China will have every
incentive to keep Russia on its side, even if that entails further
deepening its estrangement from the West.
The war has also significantly
strengthened Western unity, revived the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and turned the G7 into an effective mechanism for
coordinating the West’s response to Russian aggression. The Strategic
Compass calls the United States Europe’s “staunchest and most important
partner and a global power contributing to peace, security, stability
and democracy on our continent.” The U.S. leadership role in the current
crisis could also help Washington persuade European countries to
support its policies toward China.
A closer partnership between China and
Russia and a more effective Western grouping pose a difficult dilemma
for countries from the Global South. Votes in the UN General Assembly on
the Russian invasion illustrate this. A majority of UN members (141)
supported the initial resolution
condemning the invasion. Only 5 countries voted against the resolution,
35 abstained, and 12 did not participate. In 2023, on the anniversary
of the invasion, a similar resolution
obtained an almost identical result. This broad support was not
surprising because Russia had violated two of the core principles of the
UN Charter: nonuse of force and territorial integrity of states. But an
initiative
to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council passed much more
narrowly in April 2022, as many developing countries did not vote in
favor of it.
The fact that only about fifty countries have implemented sanctions against Russia
also shows the unwillingness of the Global South to confront Russia.
Apart from a few small states traditionally aligned with Western
countries, the great majority of developing nations do not wish to
sanction Russia. The Russian narrative that the United States and NATO
bear major responsibility for the conflict found open ears in many
developing countries. Anti-Western sentiments, partly fueled by the
legacy of colonialism and resentment against Western double standards,
played a role. A strong wish to stay outside a conflict between big
powers was also an important factor.
Many developing countries will likely
continue to strive to stay out of the fight between China and Russia and
the West. India, which is overtaking China in terms of population and
will likely become the world’s third largest economy before the end of the decade, will probably be a strong force in favor of such a multipolar world.
In practical politics, bipolar or
multipolar structures are not stark alternatives. There are many shades
of polarity, and the situation varies from sector to sector. Today, for
instance, the West still enjoys a dominant position in the global
financial system, whereas the rapidly developing high-tech sector has
already assumed a bipolar configuration, with the United States and
China rapidly decoupling from each other. In geopolitical terms, a
bipolar constellation seems a likely but not the only conceivable
scenario for the coming years. An escalation of the war in Ukraine or a
catastrophic Russian defeat could lead to estrangement between China and
Russia. China’s deep integration into the global economy could act as a
powerful mitigating factor in its competition with the United States.
Finally, domestic U.S. developments, such as the presidential elections
in 2024, could disrupt the transatlantic relationship and result in a
more independent European policy.
Liberal or Just Rules-Based?
References to a “liberal world order” in
international relations speeches and articles have become rarer, whereas
the phrase “rules-based order” has been used more frequently. With
democracy in decline across the world, “rules-based” appears more
realistic and inclusive.
The U.S. National Security Strategy offers
an interesting hierarchy of states that share some of the American
vision: the hierarchy “includes our democratic allies in Europe and the
Indo-Pacific as well as key democratic partners around the world that
share much of our vision for regional and international order even if
they do not agree with us on all issues, and countries that do not
embrace democratic institutions but nevertheless depend upon and support
a rules-based international system.” Commitment to a rules-based order
is presented as the key criteria of constructive state behavior, whereas
a lack of democracy can be excused.
Despite this apparent de-emphasis of
democracy, the Biden administration still assigns considerable
importance to the promotion of democracy and human rights. In December
2021, fulfilling a campaign promise, Biden convened a Summit for
Democracy. More than one hundred countries participated, and numerous
pledges and proposals for developing democratic governance were made. A
follow-up summit cohosted by the United States, Costa Rica, the
Netherlands, South Korea, and Zambia is planned for March 2023.
The Biden administration has made the case
for democracy not in terms of a shared aspiration for a future world
order but rather as a competition between democracies and autocracies.
The rationale for this framing becomes clear when the National Security
Strategy states that the most pressing challenge to the U.S. vision is
“from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist
foreign policy.” It goes on to state that these powers’ behaviors
threaten international peace, particularly their “waging or preparing
for wars of aggression, actively undermining the democratic political
processes of other countries, leveraging technology and supply chains
for coercion and repression, and exporting an illiberal model of
international order. Many non-democracies join the world’s democracies
in forswearing these behaviors. Unfortunately, Russia and [China] do
not.”
However, the United States has placed
itself in an awkward position by conflating its promotion of democratic
governance with its geopolitical rivalry with China and Russia. The invitation list for the Summit for Democracy left
out Hungary and Türkiye, but it included India, the Philippines, and
Poland, which have problematic records on democracy but are important
potential partners in meeting the China-Russia challenge. U.S. efforts
to promote democracy would have better chances of success if they
remained separate from geopolitical competition.
Looking more broadly, it is evident that
one of the fundamental assumptions underlying the vision of the liberal
and rules-based world order has proved overoptimistic. It was held that
liberal economic policies would speed up economic development across the
world and that greater prosperity would in turn create an irrepressible
demand for political freedom.
In fact, globalization lifted many millions of people out of poverty,
but it also severely disrupted the economic prospects for many regions
of the world. And, as China’s recent history shows, rising prosperity
can go together with a strengthening of central control.
Unfortunately, the converse
assumption—that economic setbacks can weaken democratic governance—is
closer to the truth. Democratic backsliding in recent years can partly
be attributed to the societal stress resulting from multiple crises,
including economic downturns, war, the pandemic, and climate change. And
this situation is unlikely to change soon.
However, these dark clouds have a silver
lining. It is encouraging that the validity of the normative commitments
of the UN Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, and the many
conventions on human rights elaborated within the UN system or on the
regional level are not challenged by any relevant government. This will
not provide much comfort to individuals and groups suffering from
discrimination or repression, but it offers state and civil society
actors a good basis for promoting democracy and human rights and for
holding accountable governments that breach their commitments.
Conclusion
As the post–Cold War era draws to a close,
achieving a liberal and rules-based world order looks more like a dream
than a realistic aspiration. However, there is great uncertainty as to
what will replace it. China and Russia, the most powerful challengers of
the status quo, do not propose an alternative model but rather aim at
expanding their influence in the existing system.
As geopolitical rivalries intensify, the
structures of the existing multilateral system are weakening.
Geopolitical rivalries, stronger emphasis on national sovereignty, and
increased economic protectionism are undermining cooperative regimes
that have been painstakingly put together over decades. Hopes for a
global proliferation of democracy and the rule of law have been dashed.
But a lapse into international anarchy remains wholly unlikely.
Globalization has slowed but will not be completely reversed. Economic
interdependence and international communication will continue to require
a considerable amount of institutionalized cooperation. The current
multilateral system inherited from the postwar period will therefore
survive. But the commitment to its rules will continue to diminish, and
power politics and transactional dealmaking will often prevail.
Even if the current centrifugal tendencies
remain limited, they will still severely impede efforts to address
urgent transnational problems, such as climate change, biodiversity
decline, state failure, food insecurity, poverty, and global health
threats. And if the world cannot pull together to effectively respond to
these threats, further disruption and fragmentation will certainly
follow. There is thus an urgent need to reverse the current
disintegrative dynamics and to reenergize and strengthen global
governance. There is no time to lose.
Σχόλια